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Birrer: A Jurisdictional Nightmare: Determining When an Interdependent Co

Casenotes
A JURISDICTIONAL "NIGHTMARE": DETERMINING WHEN
AN INTERDEPENDENT COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT CLAIM
"ARISES UNDER" THE COPYRIGHT ACT IN SCHOLASTIC
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. V FOX ENTERTAINMENT GROLUP, INC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

No area of law plays a more vital role in the entertainment industry than intellectual property, which continues to evolve as one
of today's most exciting and challenging legal fields. 1 With the advent of the digital age, intellectual property has gained prominence
in its protection of copyright, patent, and trademark owners. 2 Each
3
year, individuals spend billions of dollars to protect their property.
Despite this tremendous financial outlay, any protection afforded
relies wholly upon the ability of intellectual property owners to en1. See Academic Programs: Intellectual Property Law Program, at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/academicprog/intellectual.asp (last visited May 1, 2004) (suggesting
importance of intellectual property law); see also D.L. Hawley, Intellectual Property
Field Grows, LEGAL AssIsTANT TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2000, at I 1 (basing comment from
on survey conducted in 1999), available at http://www.legalassistanttoday.com/
profession/ip-field.htm. An independent research company conducted the survey by randomly contacting 200 attorneys from the 1,200 largest law firms across
the country. See id. Almost sixty percent of respondents, when asked which area of
law was growing most rapidly, cited intellectual property, which also topped the list
in a similar survey two years prior. See id. According to U.S. court records, intellectual property suits continue to rise across the country. See id. Civil copyright, patent, and trademark suits collectively rose 2.5 percent between 1994 and 1998. See
id.
2. See generally Corey Rayburn, Note, After Napster,6 VA.J.L. & TECH. 16, 77 410 (2001), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue3/v6i3-al 6-Rayburn.html (discussing
history and growth of piracy); see also RecordingIndustry Begins Suing P2PFile Sharers
Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS'N AM., at http:/
/www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/090803.asp (Sept. 8, 2003) (discussing actions
taken in attempt to quell copyright piracy). For example, since the early 1990s,
the recording industry has succumbed to a wave of ongoing digital piracy, or theft
of copyright-protected music. See id. at 1 1. Today, after the rise of Napster and its
sibling peer-to-peer networks, digital piracy has exploded. See id. at 26.
3. See generally Intellectual Property Information/Definitions, at http://www.research.uwaterloo.ca/ttlo/IP_Info.htm (last visited May 1, 2004) (defining intellectual property and "authors" of intellectual property). Intellectual property refers
to the intangible elements of certain types of property. See id. The owners of intellectual property are the creators or inventors/authors of the patents and copyrights. See Kroll: Intelligence & Investigations Services, at http://www.Krollworldwide.
com/services/investigations/ip/ (last visited May 1, 2004) (discussing potential
loss of billions when companies fail to develop intellectual property protective
strategies).
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force their rights. 4 Unfortunately, courts have struggled to create

clear standards that sufficiently define the jurisdiction in which an
intellectual property owner may seek protection. 5 Failure to develop a consistent standard may therefore delay the adjudication of
artists' rights, increase litigation costs, and most importantly, under6
mine their confidence in protection of their ownership rights.
Federal subject matter jurisdiction under the United States
Copyright Act ("Act") continues to present one of the "knottiest
procedural problems in copyright jurisprudence. '7 Federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over any "civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to . . .copyrights." It is also recognized,
however, that federal subject matter jurisdiction does not exist simply because a case involves a copyright issue.9 Federal courts have
4. See generally A RadicalRethink: The Best Way to Foster Creativity in the DigitalAge
is to Overhaul Current Copyright Laws, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 2003 (discussing current
worldwide battle concerning scope and enforcement of copyrights), available at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story-id=1547223. For example, digital piracy threatens to overwhelm so-called "content" industries. See id.
As the power and reach of the Internet continue expanding, the unlawful trading
of perfect copies may ultimately prove catastrophic to the music, movie, and publishing industries. See id.
5. See, e.g.,Jay S. Fleischman, Comment, Swimming the Murky Waters: The Second
Circuit and Subject-MatterJurisdictionin Copyright Infringement Cases from T.B. Harms
v. Eliscu to Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 42 BuTT. L. REV. 119 (1994)
(discussing difficulty federal courts experience in determining when interdependent copyright and contract claims "arise under" Copyright Act for jurisdictional
purposes); see also Daniel E. Wanat, Copyright and Contracts: The Subject MatterJurisdiction of Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(A), 11 DEPAuL-LCAJ. ART & ENT. L.
361 (2001) (discussing difficulty federal courts experience in determining when
interdependent copyright and contract claims "arise under" Copyright Act for jurisdictional purposes); James M. McCarthy, Comment, FederalSubject MatterJurisdiction: When Does a Case Involving the Breach of a Copyright Licensing Contract "Arise
Under" the Copyright Act?, 19 U. DAYrON L. REV. 165 (1993) (discussing difficulty
federal courts experience in determining when interdependent copyright and
contract claims "arise under" Copyright Act for jurisdictional purposes). See generally Michael A. de Freitas, Annotation, ExclusiveJurisdictionof FederalCourts Under 28
USCS § 1338(a) of Action Involving Breach of Contract ConcerningCopyright, 119 A.L.R.
FED. 471 (1994) (noting difficulties among federal courts in their attempt to develop consistent standard when determining whether interdependent copyright
claims "arise under" the Act).
6. For a discussion of the problems inherent in courts' inability to determine
a consistent approach in defining the jurisdiction where an intellectual property
owner may seek protection, see infra notes 48-156 and accompanying text.
7. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRrGHT,
§ 12.01 [A], at 12-14 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2003) [hereinafter NIMMER] (explaining problem as involving division of jurisdiction between state and federal
courts).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
9. See Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting cases involving copyright issues do not automatically invoke federal jurisdiction); see also Int'l Armor & Limousine Co. v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., 272
F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting federal courts do not necessarily have juris-
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consistently dismissed complaints for lack of jurisdiction if they determine the claim to constitute a state law contract action "dressed
up in copyright clothing."'1 As a result, federal courts continue to
walk a fine line between "usurping" the power of the state courts
and providing redress for copyright infringement." Further complications to this balancing act arise with the interdependence of
contract and copyright claims, which potentially masks the genuine
issues in need of resolution. 12 Because of these complexities, the
question of whether breach of a contract licensing agreement or
copyright assignment gives rise to a federal cause of action under
the Act has led courts in many circuits to claw their way through
13
this murky area of law in an attempt to reach uniformity.
This Note explores the Ninth Circuit's recent attempt to provide further definition to one of the more complex areas of copyright law in Scholastic Entertainment, Inc. v. Fox Entertainment Group,
diction over all cases involving copyright). Federal courts have consistently dismissed complaints in copyright cases presenting questions solely concerning state
contract law. See id.; see also Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380,
1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting federal courts do not necessarily have jurisdiction
over all cases involving copyright). For a discussion of Vestron, see infra note 100
and accompanying text. See, e.g., T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 824 (2d
Cir. 1964) (noting this principle traces to "precedents going back for more than a
century"). See generally Copyright Law - U.S. Federal Court Had No Jurisdiction over
Dispute to Determine Validity of Attempt to Terminate License, CONSEJO, at http://www.
consejo.blogspot.com/2003 07_13_consejo.archive.html (July 18, 2003) (noting
cases involving copyright issues do not necessarily guarantee existence of federal
subject matter jurisdiction).
10. Appellee's Brief at 16-17, Scholastic Entm't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't Group,
Inc., 336 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-55667) (noting federal courts dismiss
complaints fashioned as copyright cases when presenting only issues of state contract law); see also Dolch v. United Cal. Bank, 702 F.2d 178, 180 (9th Cir. 1983)
(stating contract questions depending on common law or equitable principles belong in state court); Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting fact that copyright as subject matter of contract does not automatically yield
federal subject matter jurisdiction). For a discussion of Topolos, see infra notes 8588 and accompanying text.
11. See Scholastic Entm't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 986
(9th Cir. 2003) (noting difficulties inherent when determining whether civil actions concerning copyrights invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction). For a discussion of the facts of the Scholastic case, see infra notes 21-35 and accompanying
text.
12. See id.; see also Vestron, 839 F.2d at 1382 (noting difficulty courts experience
when applying "sole question" rule to determine copyright jurisdiction). The
problem looms largest where courts attempt to expose cases "couched" in terms of
federal copyright but, in actuality, seek to vindicate rights created under state law.
See id.
13. See Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Pubs., Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 931 (2d Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Schoenberg 11] (discussing complexity of copyright jurisdiction and varying views of federal courts because of such complexity).
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Inc.1 4 Part II provides the salient facts and history of the Scholastic
case. 15 Part III contextualizes Scholastic in the greater historical
framework, providing a detailed overview of federal courts' efforts
to determine whether interdependent copyright and state contract
claims "arise under" the Act for purposes of exercising federal subject matter jurisdiction.16 Part IV outlines the Scholastic court's reasoning in holding that it lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction
over a purely state law contract claim.1 7 Part V critically examines
the court's analysis and its resulting conclusions. 18 Lastly, Part VI
considers the potential impact of Scholastic on copyright subject
matter jurisdiction as it specifically relates to claims raising both
copyright infringement and state law contract issues. 19
II.

FACTS: ScHoLAsTIc ENTERTAINMENT, INC. v. Fox
20

ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

In 1995, Scholastic Entertainment, Inc. ("Scholastic") and Fox
Entertainment Group, Inc. ("Fox") entered into a contract that included broadcasting the copyright-protected television series,
Goosebumps.21 For several years, the parties performed their responsibilities under the contract without incident. 22 In mid-1999, however, Scholastic discovered that the Fox Family Channel ("FFC"),
not a party to the contract, was airing the Goosebumps series. 23 Upon
14. 336 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2003).
15. For a discussion of the relevant facts in Scholastic, see infra notes 21-35 and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the varying approaches followed by federal courts
when confronted with the copyright/contract jurisdictional issue, see infta notes
36-156 and accompanying text.
17. For a narrative discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Scholastic, see
infra notes 157-80 and accompanying text.
18. For a critical discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Scholastic, see
infra notes 181-207 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion on the possible impact of Scholastic on claims involving
interdependent copyright and contract issues, see infra notes 208-18 and accompanying text.
20. 336 F.3D 982 (9th Cir. 2003).
21. See id. at 985 (discussing nature of contract between Scholastic and Fox).
Scholastic, which is a producer and marketer of motion pictures, television, and
video-programming based on children's literary works, agreed to produce a television series based on the children's book series, Goosebumps, and to license to Fox
the rights to exhibit and distribute such shows. See id. at 983. Fox was to first air
the initial exhibition of the shows on Fox Broadcasting and later distributed the
series to different television outlets for a period of years. See id. The contract was
due to expire in 2013. See id.
22. See id. at 983 (reviewing facts of case).
23. See id. at 984 (discussing dispute between Scholastic and Fox). The airings
by FFC continued through August of 2001, during which time Scholastic received
no compensation. See id. According to Scholastic, this unauthorized licensing frus-
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verifying the extent of Fox's violation, Scholastic terminated its
agreement in September 2001 and informed Fox that it planned to
insisted Scholastic could
re-license the series to third parties.2 4 Fox
25
not permissibly terminate the contract.
Shortly thereafter, Scholastic filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, claiming it had
effectively terminated the agreement and that continued broadcast
of the Goosebumps series by Fox and FFC qualified as copyright infringement. 2 6 If valid, termination of the contract would result in
the reversion of all of Fox's ownership rights back to Scholastic, and
continued use of the series would constitute copyright infringement.2 7 In its counterclaim, Fox contended the contract remained

in effect and requested the court to enjoin Scholastic from licens28
ing the series to third parties.
The district court determined that the underlying dispute between Scholastic and Fox was contractual in nature. 2 9 The court
therefore concluded that a state court could properly adjudicate
the dispute. 30 Accordingly, the district court dismissed Scholastic's
claims without prejudice and granted Fox's request for a prelimi31
nary injunction enjoining Scholastic from re-licensing the series.
In agreeing with the district court's conclusion that the dispute involved solely contract law, Scholastic made no attempt to appeal the
dismissal.3 2 Approximately four months later, the district court,
trated the entire purpose of the agreement, because Scholastic did not intend for
the Fox airings alone to comprise Scholastic's total compensation for the production of the series. See id.
24. See id. (noting Scholastic's attempt to terminate its agreement with Fox).
25. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 984 (discussing Fox's argument against Scholastic's attempt to terminate agreement). Fox argued the contract remained in effect. See id. at 985. Therefore, pursuant to the agreement, Fox argued it alone had
the right to exhibit and distribute the series until a determination regarding the
status of the agreement was made. See id.
26. See id. at 984-85 (discussing Scholastic's breach of contract claim against
Fox).
27. See id. at 985 (noting consequences of termination if successful).
28. See id. at 984 (discussing Fox's counterclaim).
29. See id. (discussing district court's reasoning).
30. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 984 (noting district court's inability to hear case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). The court of appeals expressed concern
over the state court's inability to properly exercise jurisdiction over Scholastic's
request for a declaration that it had effectively terminated the agreement because
it involved the Act. See id. at 984 n.1. The court ultimately found this conclusion
erroneous. See id.
31. See id. at 984 (discussing district court's holding in case).
32. See id. (recalling facts of case). Furthermore, Scholastic stipulated that it
would forego any attempt to re-license the Goosebumps series until a determination
of ownership had been made. See id.
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concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, dismissed
33
Fox's counterclaims sua sponte.
On appeal, Fox asserted that because the district court could
exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction, it erred in dismissing
the counterclaims.3 4 In determining whether it could properly exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Fox's counterclaims "arose under" the Act or merely
35
sought a determination of ownership.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Power to Preside Over the Issue

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal
courts have jurisdiction over "[c] ases, in Law and Equity, arising
under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made. '3 6 The United States Code in37
corporates this provision in the Intellectual Property context.
Specifically, § 1338 (a) provides that "[t] he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to ... copyrights ....
Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ...

copyright cases."'3 8

Since the enactment of § 1338(a), courts have struggled to
fully understand Congress's intent in its "arising under" language.3 9
In 1964, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
33. See id. (noting district court's ultimate disposition in case). The court
stated: "This is a contract case. It's a contract case simply and the State Court can
decide it." Id. The district court's statement clearly demonstrates that lack of subject matter jurisdiction was the reason for its dismissal of Fox's counterclaims. See
id.
34. See id. at 985 (noting Fox's appeal to Ninth Circuit).
35. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of whether Fox's counterclaims arose under the Act, see infra notes 157-80 and accompanying text.
36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See generally BLACK'S L.Aw DICTIONARY 857
(7th ed. 1999) (defining federal subject matter jurisdiction). Federal subject matterjurisdiction provides the "extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of
persons or the status of things." Id. All federal courts have limited subject matter
jurisdiction; they may hear only certain kinds of cases, as prescribed by the United
States Constitution and federal statutes. See RicHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS
PERDUE, CrVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 194 (3d ed. 2001)

(mentioning role subject matter jurisdiction plays in limiting breadth of cases federal courts may hear).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
38. Id.
39. See Mary P. Twitchell, CharacterizingFederalClaims: Preemption, Removal, and
the Arising-UnderJurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 812, 812 n.2
(1986) (noting lack of any clear definition as it relates to meaning of "arising
under"). See generally FREER & PERDUE, supra note 36, at 222. The term "arising
under" has caused problems in two areas:
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in T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu4 0 forwarded a watershed interpretation of
the language. Specifically, the court abstracted a three-part test
geared toward guiding future courts in their efforts to determine
whether interdependent copyright and contract cases "arose
41
under" the Act.

B.

28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)

Section 1338 of the United States Code delineates the circumstances under which federal district courts have jurisdiction over
federal intellectual property claims. 42 Under this section, courts
have exclusive jurisdiction in all civil actions "arising under" the
Act.4 3 However, § 1338(a) fails to specifically state when a claim

"arises under" the Act. 44 This poses a significant problem for fed-

eral courts, because it is well settled that not every complaint involv4
ing the Act "arises under" that law for purposes of § 1338(a). 5
Furthermore, the mere existence of an underlying contract dispute
in a suit relating to a copyright does not necessarily deprive a court
First is a requirement that the federal law be set forth as a claim, not as a
defense. This raises the problem of the curiously named "well-pleaded
complaint" rule. Second, and more challenging to understand, is an assessment of whether federal law is sufficiently central to the claim asserted in a well-pleaded complaint. With each of these restrictions, the
federal courts have read the statutory language "arising under" more narrowly than the constitutional language.
Id. Because of its ambiguous nature, therefore, scholars andjurists have frequently
discussed the tension surrounding the "arising under" language. See Fleischman,
supra note 5, at 120.
40. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
41. For a discussion of the T.B. Harmsdecision and the test that it established,
see infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 195 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter
GOLDSTEIN I] (discussing role § 1338 plays in copyright law). Section 1338 also
defines the jurisdiction of the federal courts over certain state law claims related to
federal Intellectual Property actions. See id.

43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
44. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 168 (emphasis added) (noting vagueness of
§ 1338(a)). On its face, § 1338(a) appears to require federal subject matterjuris-

diction over all copyright actions. See id. at 169.
45. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964) (discussing
limits of subject matter jurisdiction as it relates to Act); see also Scandinavian Satellite Sys., AS v. Prime TV Ltd., 291 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing limits
of subject matterjurisdiction as it relates to Act). For example, a "suit on a contract
does not 'arise under' the copyright laws even though a copyright may have been
the subject matter of the contract." Id. See, e.g., Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting difficulties in distinguishing which
cases "arise[ I under" the Act).
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of jurisdiction. 46 Because of the complexity in determining exactly
when a claim "arises under" the Act, federal courts have experienced significant difficulty in their attempts to properly exercise
47
federal subject matter jurisdiction under § 1338(a).
C.

Post-Enaction § 1338(a) Interpretation

Since Congress enacted § 1338(a), courts have sought to define the meaning of "arising under" in federal copyright law. 48 The
Second Circuit provided the first intensive examination of the matter in T.B. Harms.4 9 The TB. Harms court conceived of a three-part

test, which became a paradigm for future determinations of the
50
types of actions that "arise under" the Act.

1.

T.B. Harms: The Seminole Interpretation

In T.B. Harms, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant, Edward Eliscu, in a United States district court, seeking
declaratory and equitable relief.5 1 T.B. Harms claimed that under
its contract with Eliscu, Harms acquired ownership of renewal copy46. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355 (discussing instance where federal courts may
properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction). For a discussion of the Bassett decision, see infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
47. See Mark R. Kravitz, Developments in the Second Circuit 1999-2000, 33 CONN.
L. REv. 945, 1021 (2001) (noting confusing nature of § 1338(a)). "Typically, such
claims arise where the defendant has a license to exploit the plaintiff's copyright,
but is alleged to have forfeited the license by breaching the terms of the parties'
agreement, and therefore to have infringed the plaintiffs copyright through further exploitation." Id.; see also NIMMER, supra note 7, § 12.01 [A], at 12-13. State
common law governs contract-based claims and therefore state courts hear such
claims, whereas federal courts hear copyright actions. See id. at 13-14; see also Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting courts experience
difficulty where plaintiffs claims include copyright allegations and preliminary legal issues of contract under state law); Franklin v. Cannon Films, Inc., 654 F. Supp.
133, 134 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (noting copyright issue must constitute "gist," "essence,"
or "principal issue," not claim for "naked declaration of ownership").
48. For a discussion of the attempts federal courts have made in defining the
meaning of "arising under," see infra notes 75-156.
49. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 823 (discussing Second Circuit's attempt to
clarify meaning of "arising under" as it relates to federal copyright law); see also
McCarthy, supra note 5, at 168-69 (same).
50. See Wanat, supra note 5, at 372 (recognizing T.B. Harms as leading case in
determining whether claims "arise under" the Act); see also McCarthy, supra note 5,
at 166 (recognizing TB. Harms as leading case regarding question of when claims
"arise under" the Act). The three-part test provides that an action "arises under"
the Act, if and only if: (1) the complaint seeks a remedy expressly granted by the
Act; (2) the complaint requires construction of the Act; or (3) federal principles
should control the disposition of the claim. See TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828.
51. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 824-25 (discussing dispute between plaintiff
and defendant).
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rights in songs that Eliscu co-authored. 5 2 Eliscu denied transferring
53
ownership to Harms by contract.
Holding that it could not properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction under § 1338(a), the district court dismissed Harms's complaint.5 4 In reaching its conclusion, the court based its lack of

jurisdiction on Harms's failure to allege "any act or threat of copyright infringement.

' 55

On Harms's appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that no infringement existed. 56 However, the court
noted § 1338(a) failed to mention infringement, and thereby concluded "the undoubted truth that a claim for infringement 'arises
under' the Copyright Act does not establish that nothing else
can."5 7 Addressing additional theories under which the plaintiff
could possibly gain access to federal court, the court analyzed earlier Supreme Court definitions of "arising under. '58 The Second
Circuit noted that in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,59 the United
States Supreme Court applied an "ingredient theory" and construed the "arising under" language in the context of Article III of
the Constitution. 60 The Osborn Court determined federal subject
52. See id. at 824 (discussing facts of case). The litigation in T.B. Harms concerned four copyrighted songs composed by Vincent Youmans for use in the
movie, "Flying Down to Rio." See id. Youmans entered into a contract with RKO
Studios requiring him to assign certain rights, including recordation, to RKO during the existence of the copyrights and any renewals. See id. In return, RKO
agreed to hire a lyric writer and obtain the publishing rights to the lyrics. See id.
Plaintiff, T.B. Harms Co., acquired these rights from Youmans. See id. RKO hired
defendant, Edward Eliscu, as one of the lyric writers. See id. Upon completion of
this task, Youmans retained the authority to assign both the performing and publishing rights to the music and lyrics. See id.
53. See id. (discussing facts of case). The principal dispute in the case rested
upon whether or not Eliscu ever assigned his rights to the copyrights and renewals
to T.B. Harms. See id.
54. See id. at 825 (discussing district court's reasoning and ultimate disposition
in case).
55. See id. (reviewing district court's reasoning). The court concluded that
no use or threatened use of the copyrights existed and the parties sought only to
establish their ownership of the copyrights. See id. Accordingly, the Act was not at
issue and the court could not properly exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction
to rule on the contractual dispute. See id.
56. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825 (noting court of appeal's affirmation of
district court's holding).
57. Id. The court noted the phrasing of§ 1338(a) would not compel the conclusion that an action to determine ownership of a copyright does not fall under
the Act. See id.
58. See id. at 825-26 (noting court's analysis of past Supreme Court decisions
to gain more in-depth understanding of "arising under").
59. 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
60. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825 (noting Second Circuit's reference to Osborn for guidance). In Osborn, Ohio imposed a tax on a nationally charted federal
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matter jurisdiction was proper in any case where federal law comprised a necessary ingredient of the claim. 6 1 The T.B. Harms court
concluded, however, that pursuant to a subsequent Supreme Court
decision in New MarshallFireEngine Co. v. MarshallEngine Co., 6 2 the
63
ingredient theory could not apply.
While the T.B. Harms court discarded the ingredient theory as
inapplicable to its analysis, it found some merit in the "creation
6 4
test" enunciated in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,
which held, "[a] suit arises under the law that created the cause of
action. ''6 5 Because federal copyright laws do not create a cause of
bank. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 740-41. The bank, claiming the tax was unconstitutional, sued to enjoin the state auditor from collecting it. See id. The bank's charter stated that the bank had the right "to sue and be sued" in every United States
circuit court. See id. at 817. The Court interpreted this language as a grant of
federal subject matter jurisdiction because federal subject matter jurisdiction always exists when a party calls the constitutionality of a statute into question. See id.
at 819 (citation omitted). The Court further held that federal subject matter jurisdiction would exist in any case involving the bank. See id. at 822-27.
61. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 824-25 (noting federal question jurisdiction depended on whether federal question may theoretically arise as ingredient in
claim). The Court reasoned: "Whether [the federal ingredient is] in fact relied on
or not, in the defence, it is still part of the cause, and may be relied on." Id.
62. 223 U.S. 473 (1912). In New MarshallEngine Co., a case involving the question of title to a patent, the Court stated: "Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases arising under the patent laws, but not of all questions in which a
patent may be the subject-matter of the controversy. For courts of a State may...
construe and enforce contracts relating to patents." Id. at 478.
63. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828 (noting Court perceived as having adopted
significantly narrower definition of "arising under"); see also McCarthy, supra note
5, at 172-73 (acknowledging perception that Court had adopted significantly narrower definition of "arising under"). The T.B. Harms court analyzed the Supreme
Court precedent set forth in New MarshallEngine Co., concluding that the federal
grant of a copyright does not transform a contractual dispute into a federal question merely because of the contract's copyright subject matter. See id. at 172. Furthermore, expansion of federal subject matter jurisdiction would unquestionably
deny state courts jurisdiction over state matters, which mattered little to the nation
at large. See id. at 173; see also T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 826 (noting cases dealing
with federal subject matter jurisdiction over copyrights have traditionally taken
conservative line").
64. 241 U.S. 257 (1916); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (overruling Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne &Bowler

Co.).
65. Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260 (noting Court's holding in case). Applying this rule to the plaintiff's suit, the Court determined the suit to constitute one
for damages to the plaintiff's business, which resulted from the defendants'
threatened suits under the patent. See id. at 259. In its determination that the
defendants' actions "wrong[ed]" the plaintiff because they caused injury to the
plaintiffs business, the majority depended "upon the law of the State where the act
is done, not upon the patent law ...." Id. at 260. "[T]herefore[,] the suit a[rose]
under the law of the State" to the exclusion of the patent laws. Id. Accordingly,
the United States district court lacked proper jurisdiction to hear the case. See id.
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action to fix the locus of ownership, the T.B. Harms court also held
66

the creation test inapplicable.
Nevertheless, the T.B. Harms court noted a cause of action
brought to fix copyright ownership could "arise under" federal law
if the complaint included a need to determine the meaning or application of a federal law. 6 7 Citing De Sylva v. Ballentine,68 the Court
explored a new doctrine that permitted federal subject matter jurisdiction over a state-created claim if a federal interest dominated,
even in the absence of an express statute. 69 This doctrine supports
the idea that "if this 'federal common law' governed some disputed
aspect of a claim to ownership of a copyright or for the enforcement of a license, federal subject matter jurisdiction might
follow."70

The court ultimately established that an action "arises under"
the Act if, and only if: (1) the complaint seeks a remedy expressly
granted by the Act; 71 (2) the complaint requires construction of the
66. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 826-27 (holding test established in American
Well Works as too narrow); see also Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72 (9th
Cir. 1987).
67. See TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827 (discussing aspect of court's reasoning in
case). The court determined that appropriate pleadings of a pivotal question of
federal law could suffice to give federal subject matter jurisdiction even for a statecreated claim. See id.
68. 351 U.S. 570 (1956). The De Sylva Court found federal subject matter
jurisdiction over a claim created by state law because two significant questions existed concerning the Act's construction. See id. at 572. The T.B. Harms court
noted De Sylva also applied the principle that a state-created claim could "arise
under" a federal law if the complaint disclosed the necessity for determining the
meaning of such a law. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827.
69. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828 (reviewing aspect of court's rationale).
70. Id. (noting appropriate pleading as to pivotal questions of federal law may
suffice to give federal subject matter jurisdiction, even for "state-created" claims).
71. See id. at 828 (discussing aspect of court's holding in case); see also McCarthy, supra note 5, at 185. The T.B. Harms court first found infringement claims to
"arise under" the Act. See id. As the primary wrong addressed directly by the Act,
infringement unquestionably belongs in federal court. See id. Consequently, if a
complaint includes only the elements required for infringement action, and fails
to contain any claims based on state grounds, § 1338(a) will grant federal subject
matter jurisdiction. See id. However, federal courts recognize other actions, aside
from infringement, over which they may claim jurisdiction. See id.; see also Bassett v.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 349 (2d Cir. 2000). The analysis under
T.B. Harms turns on what the plaintiff alleges on the face of the complaint. See
generally 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.2.1,
§ 13.2.1.1 (a) (1989) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN II].
But see Amy B. Cohen, "Arising Under"Jurisdiction and the Copyright Laws, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 337, 373 (1993). By requiring federal courts to accept all cases in
which a complaint seeks a remedy provided by the Act or raises a claim requiring
interpretation of the Act, it might "open the floodgates," thereby drowning federal
courts in the "litigation of cases that are at heart contract disputes." Id.
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Act; 72 or (3) federal principles should control the disposition of the
claim.7 3 Since the plaintiff's claim failed to fulfill any of these three
categories outlined by the court, the court of appeals dismissed it
74
for lack of jurisdiction.
2.

Confusion in the Wake of T.B. Harms: Three Emerging
Interpretations

In the forty years since T.B. Harms, courts have embraced three
different interpretations of the "arising under" language: (1) the
"essence of the claim" standard, 75 (2) the "well-pleaded complaint"
'77
standard, 76 and (3) the "Schoenberg test.
a.

The "Essence of the Claim" Standard

Federal courts following this standard base their jurisdictional
decisions on the "essence of the claim." 78 All of the cases using the
72. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d. at 828 (discussing aspect of court's holding in
case); see also McCarthy, supra note 5, at 185-86. According to TB. Harms, the
second category of cases "arising under" the Act includes those requiring construction of the Act. See id. Even if a dispute is contractual in nature and, therefore,
state controlled, interpretations of federal statutes are a federal concern and subject to federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id.; see also Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v.
Klone Mfg., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). For a discussion of Foxrun, see
infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
73. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827-28 (discussing aspect of court's holding in
case); see also McCarthy, supra note 5, at 186. The third category of actions "arising
under" the Act consists of actions involving distinctive federal policies. See generally
GOLDSTEIN II, supranote 71, § 13.2.1.1 (c). Federal courts will exercise subject matter jurisdiction so long as the claim meets one of these three requirements. See
Bassett, 204 F.3d at 349.
74. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827-28 (discussing court's final disposition in
case). The Second Circuit ultimately found the claim did not satisfy the test and
the district court acted properly in dismissing Harms's claims. See id. The court
noted that " [t]
he relevant statutes create no explicit right of action to enforce or
rescind assignments of copyrights, nor does any copyright statute specify a cause of
action to fix the locus of ownership." Id. at 827.
75. For a discussion of the "essence of the claim" standard, see infranotes 7898 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of the "well-pleaded complaint" standard, see infra notes
99-128 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of the Schoenberg standard, see infra notes 129-56 and accompanying text. While the three categories delineated in T.B. Harms represent
the area of settled and undisputed copyright jurisdictional law where cases will
always "arise under" the Act, there are also those cases that will never "arise under"
the Act. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 186. Between these two bright-line categories lies a gray area causing significant confusion among courts in their ability to
determine whether alleged claims constitute infringement or breach of contract
actions. See id. at 186-87.
78. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 176-77 (explaining "essence" standard).
This standard is also known as the "essence" or "essence of the dispute." See id. See
generally Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 833 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987); Topolos v.
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"essence" standard build from T.B. Harms's policy that state courts

may exercise jurisdiction over claims of minimal federal significance.7 9 In an effort to avoid expanding the meaning of § 1338(a),
the decisions in this line of cases suggest taking a conservative approach toward cases involving statutory jurisdiction over copyrights.80 This standard derives from two main sources of support.
Courts using this standard follow the proposition from the T.B.
Harms district court opinion that the complaint's formal allegations
must give way to the substance of the claim. 8 1 These courts also
build upon the T.B. Harms view that courts should narrowly read
provisions conferring federal subject matterjurisdiction so as not to
deprive state courts of jurisdiction over matters of minor federal
8 2
significance.

The first case that enunciated this interpretation of T.B. Harms
was Elan Associates, Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd.8 3 Looking beCaldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 992 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding federal subject matter jurisdiction proper because copyright infringement constituted "essence" of complaint); Felix Cinematografica, S.R.L. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 671 F. Supp. 313,
315 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing copyright claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because court concluded "essence of claim" was contractual); Berger v. Simon
& Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding court lacked federal
subject matter jurisdiction because contract dispute actually created "essence" of
infringement claim); Keith v. Schruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding court lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction because contract dispute
actually created "essence" of infringement claim); Stepdesign, Inc. v. Research Media, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 32, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (ruling court lacked federal subject
matter jurisdiction as contract dispute created "essence" of infringement claim);
Elan Assocs., Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd., 339 F. Supp. 461, 462 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (dismissing claim because ownership dispute formed "essence" of
complaint).
79. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 190 (explaining rationale for use of "essence" standard); see also T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir.
1964). The court precisely stated, "[t]he cases dealing with statutory jurisdiction
over . . . copyrights have taken . . . [a] conservative line .... ." Id. at 826.
"[E]xpansion would entail depriving the state courts of any jurisdiction over matters having so little federal significance." Id.
80. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 190. In an attempt to further the policy of
avoiding expansion of the statute, these cases "stand for the idea that a plaintiff
cannot manipulate federal subject matter jurisdiction, when none is appropriate,
simply by artfully drafting the complaint." Id.
81. SeeWanat, supra note 5, at 375 (explaining "essence" standard). Put more
clearly, several federal courts have concluded that a complaint stating a cause of
action for copyright infringement and seeking remedies under the Copyright Act
may nevertheless fail to come within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under
§ 1338(a). See id.
82. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 180 (noting courts' use of T.B. Harms decision for guidance); see also T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 826.
83. 339 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). This case involved the execution of a
contract, which provided that the plaintiff would enjoy the exclusive right to publish and obtain copyrights on certain music by Carly Simon. See id. The defendant,
however, continued to obtain copyrights of Simon's compositions. See id. The
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yond the plain language of the complaint, the Elan court interpreted the T.B. Harms test to hold it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the case "essentially" involved a dispute as to
84
the ownership of the copyright.
Although the court in Topolos v. Caldewey85 used different language in its reasoning, it adopted the "essence" standard in principle.8

6

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that actions "arise under"

the Act when a plaintiff seeks a remedy expressly granted by the Act
or asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act.8

7

After search-

ing for the "principal issue," the Ninth Circuit concluded the district court incorrectly dismissed the action. 88
The district court in Stepdesign, Inc. v. Research Media, Inc 9 also
adopted the "essence" standard. The court reasoned that questions
of contract ownership did not necessarily qualify as questions for
the federal courts.9 0 After noting the absence of an underlying
plaintiff sued in New York State court for both breach of contract and copyright
infringement. See id. at 461-62.
84. See id. at 462 (discussing court's reasoning in case). The court found that
the resolution of the dispute depended ultimately upon the validity of the plaintiff's exclusive publishing agreement with Simon. See id. The court further reasoned that, although the action was couched in terms of infringement, in reality
the suit desired to establish valid title by seeking to enforce a contract between an
author and a publisher. See id. Accordingly, the case did not "arise under" the
copyright laws so as to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
85. 698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983). In this case, Topolos and defendant, Vintage Image, entered into an exclusive publishing contract regarding a book. See id.
at 992. The contract required Vintage to pay royalties to Topolos in consideration
for receiving all rights under the copyright. See id. Vintage thereby obtained copyrights in its own name in accordance with the agreement. See id. A second book
published by Vintage listed a co-defendant, Hinkle, as the author and copyright
owner. See id. Topolos alleged Hinkle's book infringed upon his beneficial copyright ownership of the original book. See id.
86. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 182 (reviewing Topolos court's reasoning in
case). In deciding whether a case "arose under" the Act, the district court noted
the importance of focusing on the "principal issue" for resolution. See id.
87. See Topolos, 698 F.2d at 993 (discussing court's rationale). The court
found difficulty in cases where a plaintiff claims infringement under the Act and
raises preliminary state contract issues. See id. The court ultimately agreed with
the district court's holding that the "principal" issue of the case, or the "essence" of
the plaintiffs claim, should determine whether federal subject matter jurisdiction
existed. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 183.
88. See Topolos, 698 F.2d at 994 (discussing court's holding in case). The
Ninth Circuit determined the ownership issue constituted only "a threshold issue
and not the principal one." See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 183.
89. 442 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Stepdesign, the plaintiff sought a declaratory order that certain copyrights had reverted to him upon breach of contract and, therefore, the suit was merely one to determine ownership of the
copyright. See id. at 33.
90. See id. at 33 (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir.
1964)); see also Wells v. Universal Pictures Co., 166 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1948)
(stating patent or copyright only incidentally involved does not invoke federal sub-
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claim for infringement, the court held it could not properly exercise federal jurisdiction. 9 1
Although the "essence" standard possesses several strengths, as
previously noted, it also suffers from various weaknesses. 92 For instance, the determination of state or federal subject matter jurisdiction, even in the clearest of situations, may often turn on the issue
of the plaintiffs "primary and controlling" purpose.9 3 This differs
from resting the primary focus on the parties' intent, as practiced in
traditional contract law, because jurisdiction instead hinges on what
the judge believes the contract symbolizes.9 4 As a result, the judge
becomes one who not only judges, but also one who determines
95
what is to be judged.
Furthermore, this standard blurs, if not ignores, the distinction
between § 1338(a) claims and the question of deciding the copyright claim on its merits. 96 The result becomes a dismissal of the

plaintiff's action on the jurisdictional grounds that the copyright
claim is not the "essence of the claim," which leaves open the question of whether a valid copyright claim exists at all.9 7 No state court
can resolve this question.9 8

ject matter jurisdiction); Muse v. Mellin, 212 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd,
339 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting mere mention of term "copyright" is not compelling enough to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction).
91. See Stepdesign, Inc., 442 F. Supp. at 33 (citing TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825).
The court concluded that because the complaint was focused solely on the contractual breaches, "any finding of infringement would be clearly incidental to the
main purpose of plaintiffs suit .

. . ."

Id. at 34.

92. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 129-30 (discussing weaknesses of "essence"
standard).
93. See id. (mentioning weakness found in "essence" standard); see also NIMMER, supra note 7, § 12.01 [A], at 12-14.
94. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 129.
95. See id. at 129-30. This elevation of the court's role is both illegal and undesirable. See id. at n.65. In Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, the Fourth Circuit
held "that the district court's search for the 'principal and controlling issue' in the
case exceeded the limited factual inquiry necessary" for the dismissal motion. 895
F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir. 1990).
96. See Wanat, supra note 5, at 395 (noting "essence" standard might benefit
from a "sharper distinction" between the § 1338(a) jurisdictional issue and a merits determination).
97. See id. at 394-95 (explaining "essence" standard). Rather, courts following
the "essence" standard would benefit from considering whether the decision they
make is one on the merits versus one merely affecting the proper forum for the
plaintiff's action. See id. at 395.
98. See id. (noting limitation of state courts). The federal court's jurisdiction
over the action "arising under" the Act is "exclusive." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
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The "Well-Pleaded Complaint" Standard

Federal courts following this standard base their jurisdictional
decisions on how the plaintiff pleads his case in the complaint.9 9 In
other words, whatever the plaintiff pleads is what he or she means,
and the court should not engage in any interpretation of the complaint. 10 0 Courts using the "well-pleaded complaint" standard focus
on two main sections of the T.B. Harms decision for support.10 1
First, under T.B. Harms, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists
10 2
wherever "the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act."

Second, according to the Second Circuit, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff directs his complaint against an
infringing use and refers to the license only incidentally.' 0 3 Therefore, courts may not exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction if
the plaintiff sues to set the license aside and only incidentally seeks
recovery for the infringing use. 1°4 Courts apply these two portions
of TB. Harms to establish the basis for the "well-pleaded complaint"
05
approach.
99. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 175 (discussing "well-pleaded complaint"
standard). This standard is also known as the "face of the complaint" rule or
"pleadings" test. See id.
100. See id. (explaining "well-pleaded complaint" standard). See generally Vestron v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff's complaint alleged ownership of the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute two
motion pictures in the form of videocassettes. See id. at 1380-81. The plaintiffs
complaint also alleged that the defendant's acts constituted copyright infringement and sought relief under the Act. See id. at 1382. The court of appeals exercised jurisdiction, holding that whether the plaintiff's case "arose under" the Act
depended upon whether the court determined that the complaint stated a "bona
fide infringement claim." Id. at 1381.
101. See generally Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969
(4th Cir. 1990) (noting Fourth Circuit's rejection of "essence" standard and holding subject matter jurisdiction exists when complaint asks for remedy provided in
Act); see also Vestron, Inc., 839 F.2d at 1381-82 (holding court could exercise subject
matter jurisdiction because complaint sought remedy expressly granted by federal
copyright law); Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v. Klone Mfg., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 86, 89
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting "essence" standard in determining whether court could
exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction to hear suit brought under Lanham Act
for trademark infringement).
102. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 175 (emphasis added) (noting courts
adopting this approach focus their analysis on first part of T.B. Harms test).
103. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 823 (2d Cir. 1964) (discussing
jurisdictional aspect of court's holding).
104. See id. (discussing limitation of federal courts to hear certain claims);
McCarthy, supra note 5, at 175. Courts apply this jurisdictional rule to a situation
not addressed in T.B. Harms - when a defendant licensed to use a copyright on
specific terms is alleged to have relinquished the grant through breach of contract.
See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 175 n.89.
105. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 175 (noting courts' use of TB. Harms decision for guidance when applying the "well-pleaded complaint" standard). See, e.g.,
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The decision in Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v. Klone Mfg., Inc. 10 6 best
establishes the "well-pleaded complaint" standard. 0 7 In that case,
the district court noted that even when the "essence" of a complaint
is contractual in nature, a plaintiff's complaint might continue to
raise federal statutory questions necessitating determination by a
federal court.10 8 Therefore, the court applied the "well-pleaded
complaint" standard and concluded that pleadings must be directed against the offending use, the license must be referred to
only by way of anticipatory replication, and a claim involving a
trademark should not necessarily invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction.1 0 9 The court ultimately concluded that, because
Foxrun's complaint alleged ownership of both a trademark and infringing use and sought remedies expressly granted by the Lanham
Act, the court could properly exercise federal subject matter
jurisdiction.' 10

The case of Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond" I likewise
characterized the "well-pleaded complaint" standard as viewed by
Vestron, 839 F.2d at 1380. For further discussion of the facts in Vestron, see supra
note 100.
106. 686 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The court applied the "well-pleaded
complaint" standard to support the holding that a federal court could hear a trademark infringement case based upon failure to perform obligations under a trademark license agreement. See id. at 89.
107. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 175 (noting importance of Foxrun case as it
relates to application of "well-pleaded complaint" standard).
108. See id. at 175-76 (discussing district court's reasoning in case). Although
Foxrun represents a trademark case, the jurisdictional issue bears similarity to a
copyright claim because both are matters of federal subject matter jurisdiction
under § 1338(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
109. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 176-77 (noting district court's use of "wellpleaded complaint" standard in its analysis).
110. See Foxrun Workshop, Ltd., 686 F. Supp. at 89, 91 (discussing district
court's holding in case). The federal trademark laws are also known as the "Lanham Act." See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000). In dicta, the court noted
that the "essence" standard went against public policy. See Foxrun Workshop, Ltd.,
686 F. Supp. at 90. Furthermore, the "essence" standard left jurisdiction open to
the question as the parties conducted discovery and refined the issues in the case.
See id. Therefore, the court favored the "well-pleaded complaint" standard, since it
permitted the determination of jurisdiction as a preliminary matter and thereby
created predictability and uniformity. See id.; McCarthy, supra note 5, at 177 n.108.
111. 895 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff, Arthur Young & Co., entered
into a contract with the City of Richmond. See id. at 968. Arthur Young & Co.
contracted to design and install an on-line computer customer information and
billing system. See id. When Arthur Young & Co. experienced difficulties with the
program, the city complained, claiming that Arthur Young & Co. failed to meet
scheduled deadlines in the contract. See id. In turn, Arthur Young & Co. claimed
it deserved additional compensation for "out-of-scope" work. See id. Eventually,
the city locked Arthur Young & Co. out of the work-place. See id. Arthur Young &
Co. filed suit in state court for breach of contract in response to this lockout. See
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the Fourth Circuit.1 12 Rather than searching the complaint for its
"primary and controlling purpose," the court held that subject matterjurisdiction in a copyright infringement suit turned on whether
13
the complaint requested a remedy provided for by the Act.
Most recently, the decision by the Second Circuit in Bassett v.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe1 14 adopted the "well-pleaded complaint"
standard. 1 15 The Bassett decision came in response to the threeprong test developed by the court in Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc.' 16 The Bassett court rejected the Schoenberg test, characterizing it as "unworkable" for two reasons. 1 17 First, the court explained
that depriving individuals of a federal forum would deny them the
benefit of copyright remedies because their copyright claims fol-

id. The plaintiff then obtained and registered a copyright for the program it installed and filed an infringement suit in federal court. See id.
112. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 177. In that case, the district court held
copyright infringement did not comprise the "principal and controlling issue of
the case." See Arthur Young, 895 F.2d at 969. The district court viewed the infringement action as essentially a contract dispute governed by state law. See id. at 99394.
113. See Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing
court's holding in case). The court specifically rejected the "essence" standard in
its holding. See id.
114. 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000). The Bassett court not only reaffirmed the
court's decision in T.B. Harms but also attempted to clarify its "nebulous" reasoning. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, From the Dead Sea Scrolls to the DigitalMillennium;
Recent Developments in Copyright Law, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 19, 48-49 (2000).
115. For further discussion of the Bassett decision, see infra notes 117-23 and
accompanying text.
116. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992). For further discussion of the Schoenberg II
decision and the Schoenberg test, see infra notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
117. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 352 (noting different approach taken by Bassett
court). The Bassett court described the Schoenberg court's approach to the jurisdictional issue as dictum and "a digression that had no bearing on the resolution of
any issue decided by the appeal." Id. at 351 n.6. The court further explained that
"[t]he test had been severely criticized in the copyright scholarship." Id. at 353 n.8
(citing 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1073 (1994)); see also
Parachute Press, Inc. v. Scholastic, Inc., No. 99-7235, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21398,
at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 22, 2000); Cohen, supra note 71, at 363, 365, 374). Bassett
contrasted the TB. Harms and Schoenbergtests - the TB. Harms test differed significantly from the essence of the dispute or merely incidental test used in Schoenberg
II. See id. "The analysis in TB. Harms turns on what is alleged on the face of the
complaint, while the essence-of-the-dispute or merely-incidental test looks rather at
what defense will be proffered." Id. (citing Bassett, 204 F.3d at 349).
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lowed the contract dispute.1 18 Second, the court characterized the
Schoenberg test as "vague". 119
While the Bassett decision reaffirmed T.B. Harms and the principles underlying the rule in that case, it attempted to clarify some
118. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 352 (discussing court's reasoning in case); Wanat,
supra note 5, at 387. Infringement is the most important action the Act affords the
copyright owner against others. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2000). Because the federal court is the exclusive forum before which this action may be adjudicated, a
finding that the court lacks jurisdiction prevents adjudication in any other judicial
forum. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 352. As a result, the Bassett court opined that
"[s] uch denial of copyright remedies undermines the Act's capacity to protect copyright interests." Id.
119. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 353 (discussing court's reasoning in case); Wanat,
supra note 5, at 387-88 (pointing out ambiguity of Schoenberg test). The Bassett
court noted the general difficulty in applying the Schoenberg test for several reasons.
See id. First, a plaintiff could not predict whether the federal court could exercise
jurisdiction over the action. See id. In other words, because the court in Schoenberg
//based its analysis more on the defense, rather than on the demands, asserted in
the complaint, the plaintiffs attorney was unable to determine whether filing
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal or state court was possible. See id. at
n.165; see also Bassett, 204 F.3d at 353. Furthermore, the complaint will not necessarily reveal whether its claim of infringement and prayer for copyright remedies is
"incidental to" a contract dispute. See Wanat, supra note 5, at 389.
Second, "the [Bassett] court noted that because the plaintiffs complaint may
be grounded in copyright infringement, a federal court had no reason to question
an assertion ofjurisdiction under section 1338(a)." Id.; see also Scandinavian Satellite Sys., AS v. Prime TV Ltd., 291 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Bassett, 204 F.3d at
353. Therefore, the face of the complaint raised no issue of whether the copyright
infringement claim was incident to a contract claim. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 354. In
answer to the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim, "the defendant, like the
plaintiff, may think it desirable to have them adjudicated in federal court .... Id.
As a result, the defendant's answer may not raise the dominance of the contracts
issues at the pleading stage. See id. At that point, the federal court cannot even
rely on the defendant to raise the "incidental" nature of the copyright issues at the
pleading stage of the proceeding. See Wanat, supra note 5, at 389.
In raising a third difficulty with Schoenberg, the Bassett court noted that the test
required the court to determine factually complex issues relating to the merits at
the outset of the litigation process, before the court could even familiarize itself
with the case. See id. These factual determinations in turn could require extensive
hearings. See id. Therefore, it appears that the Bassett court concerned itself with
the viability of resolving the subject matter jurisdictional issue near the outset of
the suit, as well as its inability to decide that issue without an adjudication of the
copyright infringement and breach of contract claims. See id. at 390.
Finally, the Bassett court explained that the Schoenberg court, in deviating from
the T.B. Harms test, failed to follow governing Supreme Court authority upon
which the latter relied. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 348-49, 355. The Bassett court could
not reconcile the Schoenberg I1 court's reliance on whether the disputed issues focused on matters of contract ownership rather than copyright with the American
Well Works formulation that a "suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action." Id. at 355. Furthermore, the test conflicted with the well-established approach to federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to which courts determine jurisdiction by ascertaining whether the plaintiffs complaint asserts a right under
federal law. See Netanel, supra note 114, at 48-49.
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of Harms's more nebulous language. 20 As such, the Bassett court
determined: (1) the "suit arises under the law that creates the cause
of action," 12 1 and (2) jurisdiction should be decided based upon
the allegations within the plaintiff's complaint. 12 2 Ultimately, the
Bassett court concluded that federal courts could properly exercise
jurisdiction when a complaint alleges a claim or seeks a remedy provided by
12 3
the Act.
The "well-pleaded complaint" standard also suffers from a significant weakness. 124 Federal courts exercise jurisdiction based on
the face of the plaintiff's complaint. 25 Facts introduced subsequent to the pleadings phase of the proceeding, however, may reveal that the plaintiff failed to raise a copyright claim. 126 In this
12 7
situation, a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is inappropriate.
Rather, the court, upon finding jurisdiction, should enter judgment
on the merits against the plaintiff finding that no copyright claim
28
existed.1
c.

The Schoenberg Test

Because of the uncertainty left in the wake of T.B. Harms, the
Second Circuit in Schoenberg embraced a test to ensure certainty and
120. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964). The second and third categories in the T.B. Harms test have created substantial confusion
among federal courts.
121. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355 (discussing aspect of court's holding in case);
see also Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). For
further discussion of American Well Works, see supranotes 64-66 and accompanying
text.
122. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355 (discussing aspect of court's holding in case);
see also The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("[T]he party
who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon, and therefore does
determine whether he will bring a 'suit arising under' the patent or other law of
the United States by his declaration or bill."); Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355 (noting
federal courts must determine from face of plaintiffs complaint whether they can
properly exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction under § 1338(a)) (citing Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914)).
123. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355. The court excluded the remaining two
prongs of the T.B. Harms test from its analysis. See id.
124. See Wanat, supra note 5, at 394 (noting flaws of "well-pleaded complaint"
standard).
125. See id. (discussing method courts apply in determining whether complaint is sufficiently "well-pleaded" to properly exercise federal subject matter
jurisdiction).
126. See id. at 394-95 (explaining flaws of "well-pleaded complaint" standard).
127. See id.
128. See id. (explaining action courts should take when no copyright claim
exists under "well-pleaded complaint" standard).
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uniformity among the courts within that circuit. 129 The court se-

lected a unique interpretation in an effort to ensure fairness, predictability, and equity among other courts. 13 0 In that case,
Schoenberg, the owner of a copyright in a literary work, claimed
that the defendants, book publishers, breached their licensing contract with him and thereafter infringed his copyright by publishing
and offering his work for sale. 131 On appeal from ajudgment holding one of the defendant's former attorneys in contempt, the attorney took the position that because the copyright infringement
action was simply a contracts claim "disguised" as one of infringement, the district court lacked jurisdiction over that dispute and,
13 2
therefore, erred in holding him in contempt.
In its analysis, the Second Circuit looked to its decision in T.B.
Harms for guidance.1 33 However, the court recognized that T.B.
Harms, which focused solely on the ownership issue without any allegations of infringement, did not address the problem in the instant case. 134 The unique jurisdictional issue facing the Schoenberg

court was whether a claim asserting infringement because of a
breach of contract licensing or assignment of a copyright "arose
129. For a discussion of the Schoenberg test, see infra notes 130-56 and accompanying text.
130. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 134 (noting Second Circuit's attempt to
eliminate as much confusion and complexity as possible by adopting uniform
rule).
131. See Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Pubs., Inc., 971 F.2d. 926, 928-30 (2d Cir.
1992) (discussing facts of case). Schoenberg entered into a publishing agreement
with Steimatzky Publishing of North America, Inc., whereby the latter would publish Schoenberg's work. See id. at 928. Schoenberg retained the copyright, but
granted a license to Steimatzky to publish the book. See id. Steimatzky agreed to
perform four duties. See id. After publication of the book in 1989, Schoenberg
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
alleging that the publishers had breached the contract by failing to perform the
four duties to which they had agreed. See id.
132. The district court granted the plaintiffs motion to compel discovery. See
Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Pubs., 140 F.R.D. 282, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated by
971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Schoenberg 1]. The defendant's attorney,
however, refused to comply with the motion on the grounds the court should permit him to file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction before
being required to complete discovery. See id. at 285. After the Second Circuit denied his petition for a writ of mandamus requesting vacation of the Rule 37 order,
the defendant's attorney maintained his refusal to comply with the order and the
Second Circuit held him in contempt of that order. See id.
133. See Schoenberg II, 971 F.2d at 931 (recognizing difficulty court experienced during its analysis). The court recognized the difficulty level of the case,
characterizing it as a complex issue in a "murky" area that had confounded and
divided the Second Circuit. See id.
134. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 135 (noting Schoenberg H court's inability
to apply T.B. Harms test because facts and issues presented in each case differed).
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under" the Act.1 35 Therefore, the court held the T.B. Harms test
inapplicable. 13 6 Unable to find a satisfactory doctrine, the Second
Circuit looked beyond the boundaries of its own decisions and developed a three-prong test to clarify a similar test applied by the
District of Columbia circuit court in Costello Publishing Co., Inc. v.
137

Rotelle.

Under this test, a district court must first determine whether
the infringement claim is merely "incidental" to the claim for a determination of ownership or contractual rights.1 38 Second, the
court must determine whether the claim is more than incidental
and whether the complaint alleges a breach of a covenant or a condition. 139 Third, if the complaint alleges breach of a covenant, the
court must ascertain whether the breach is so material as to provide
the grantor a right of rescission.1 40 The asserted claim "arises
141
under" the Act if the breach would create a right of rescission.
Although the three-prong Schoenberg test appears to provide an
orderly procedure for federal courts to follow in determining
135. See Wanat, supra note 5, at 386 (discussing issue in case); see also T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964). In TB. Harms, the court
determined that an action "arises under" the Act if, and only if, the complaint
seeks a remedy expressly granted by the Act. See id. Because Schoenberg sought
damages for alleged infringement, as well as an injunction against future infringements, the court held that he clearly asserted a claim "arising under" the Act. See
Schoenberg II, 971 F.2d at 931.
136. See Schoenberg I, 971 F.2d at 931 (discussing court's rationale). Although
the T.B. Harms court concluded that federal subject matter jurisdiction did not
arise where the sole issue was one of copyright ownership without any allegations
of infringement, the Schoenberg II court determined that the TB. Harms court
failed to address the problem. See id.
137. 670 F.2d 1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Schoenberg II court looked to
Costello after failing to find a satisfactory doctrine within the Second Circuit. See
Schoenberg II, 971 F.2d at 932. Under this test, "a district court must [first] determine whether the complaint alleges a breach of condition to, or a covenant of, the
contract licensing or assigning the copyright." Id.; see also Costello, 670 F.2d at 1045.
If a plaintiff alleges a breach of a condition, then the district court may exercise
subject matter jurisdiction. See id. If the complaint merely alleges a breach of a
covenant in the agreement licensing or assigning the copyright, however, then the
court must next determine whether the breach is so material that it created a right
of rescission in the grantor. See id. If a breach would create a right of rescission,
then the asserted claim "arises under" the Act. See id.
138. See Schoenberg II, 971 F.2d at 932 (describing first prong of test); see also
Costello, 670 F.2d at 1045.
139. See Schoenberg II, 971 F.2d at 932 (describing second prong of test); see
also Costello, 670 F.2d at 1045.
140. See Schoenberg II, 971 F.2d at 932-33 (describing third prong of test); see
also Costello, 670 F.2d at 1045.
141. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 136 (explaining third prong of test).
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whether a claim "arises under" the Act, each part of the test con142
tains inherent weaknesses.
i.

Prong One: An Incidental Complaint

Under the first prong, a district court, when faced with a complaint for copyright infringement based upon breach of a licensing
contract, must determine whether the contract or copyright claims
are merely incidental to each other. 143 The term "incidental" may
become problematic because it invariably permits judges to exercise excessive discretion. 144 While judicial discretion creates no
problem in most cases, it may result in two judges deciding the
upon
same case differently, effectively removing the predictability
145
system.
judicial
the
with
which many rely in dealing
ii.

Prong Two: Breach of Condition or Covenant

Under the second prong, the district court should determine
whether the complaint alleges a breach of a condition or a breach
of a covenant in the licensing contract.' 46 The Schoenberg test states
that if the complaint alleges breach of a condition of the contract,
then federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. 147 If a covenant is
allegedly violated, however, the district court should proceed to the
148
third prong.
A criticism of this prong goes back to the Supreme Court decision in Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.149 In its opinion, the Court explicitly
stated that where a complainant "makes his suit one for recovery of
142. See id. at 137-39 (noting deficiencies of Schoenberg test).
143. See Schoenberg II, 971 F.2d at 932 (delineating first part of test).
144. See Fleischman,supra note 5, at 137. But see McCarthy, supranote 5, at 192
(noting two policy reasons demonstrate need for this first level of inquiry). First, it
would be inconsistent with the policies of the Act to limit a copyright holder to
state law remedies when Congress both provides remedies for infringement and
gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to award them. See id. Prevention of
fraud constitutes the second policy concern supporting this first level of inquiry.
See id.
145. But see T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting
court's exercise of judicial discretion did not interfere with or impose upon involved parties).
146. See Schoenberg II, 971 F.2d at 932 (delineating second prong of test).
147. See id. at 932-33.
148. See id. (explaining application of test). In undertaking this third step,
the court "analyze [s] whether the breach is so material as to create a right of rescission in the grantor." Id. at 933.
149. 270 U.S. 496 (1926). In Luckett, the Court held that an action against a
patent licensee - requesting royalties owed, an accounting, and an injunction
against future alleged infringements - did not "arise under" the patent laws, and,
therefore, the Court could not exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
at 510. "'Covenant' is distinguished from a 'condition' in that the former goes to
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royalties under a contract of license or assignment, or for damages
for a breach of its covenants ... he does not give the federal district
courtjurisdiction ... "150 The Second Circuit demonstrated inconsistency when it departed, without providing its reason for doing so,
151
from precedent upon which it relied so heavily.
iii.

Prong Three: Rescission

The third prong of the Schoenberg test applies in the event the
alleged breach of contract is merely a breach of a covenant within
the contract.1 52 If the alleged breach pertains to a covenant, the
relevant issue becomes whether that covenant creates a right of rescission on the part of the plaintiff. 153 The term "right of rescis154
sion," in and of itself, carries an unclear meaning.
The problem with this prong becomes clear, however, if courts
interpret "right of rescission" to mean what it does in the normal
course of dealings. 155 If they do so, then many federal courts will
continue to exercise jurisdiction over cases solely alleging breaches
156
of contract.
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Scholastic court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Fox's counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 157 Recognizing the issue as complex and heavily fact
the very meaning and purpose of the contract while the latter only a component of
it." Fleischman, supra note 5, at 138 n.118.
150. Luckett, 270 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added) (discussing Court's reasoning
in case).
151. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 138. The T.B. Harms court cited the
Luckett case extensively. See id. at n.119. Because the Second Circuit supported,
rather than undermined, the court's decision, it remains "good law." See id.
152. See Schoenberg II, 971 F.2d at 932-33 (delineating third prong of test).
153. See id.
154. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 138 (identifying term "right of rescission"
as vague). See generally Rotardier v. Entm't Co. Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (explaining weakness of test's third prong). The issue in that case
involved a covenant. See id. at 921. Violation of the covenant gave rise to the plaintiffs right of rescission, but the court could not exercise jurisdiction because it
found the infringement to be merely incidental. See id.
155. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 138-39. The third prong essentially
forms a loop back to the first prong. See id. "Assuming that a claim for copyright
infringement is not incidental, it must be determined whether the claim is for the
violation of a condition or a covenant." Id. at 139. If the claim is for a covenant,
the court must decide whether a right of rescission exists. See id.
156. See id. (noting potential for future problems with third prong if not
clarified).
157. See Scholastic Entm't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 989
(9th Cir. 2003). The district court held that Scholastic's success in terminating the
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dependent, the court applied the TB. Harms test, which it designated as the "majority rule," to determine whether it could exercise
jurisdiction.1 58 The court focused its analysis on this test's first category, which states that a complaint "arises under" the Act if, and
only if, it seeks a remedy expressly granted by the Act. 159 While it
acknowledged the importance of the remaining two categories, the
160
court found them inapplicable to the instant facts in the case.
A.

Resolving the Ownership Dispute

The Scholastic court analyzed the rationale of several earlier
Ninth Circuit decisions to determine whether Fox's counterclaims
sought a remedy expressly granted by the Act. 1 6 1 The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the district court's holding in Topolos, determined
that the plaintiff successfully fulfilled the pleading requirements by
alleging both ownership and infringement. 16 2 As the Ninth Circuit
noted, a qualified infringement allegation suffices as a clear question of copyright law. 163 Unlike the plaintiff in Topolos, however,
agreement constituted a pure question of state contract law appropriate for adjudication in state court. See id.
158. See id. at 986 (noting first instance where any circuit has addressed TB.
Harms test as majority rule); see also Tech LawJournal Daily E-mail Alert, at http://
www.techlawjournal.com/alert/2003/07/21.asp (July 21, 2003) (explaining Ninth
Circuit's adoption of T.B. Harms as majority rule). See generally Scandinavian Satellite Sys., AS v. Prime TV Ltd., 291 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining Ninth
Circuit's adoption of T.B. Harms as majority rule); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2000) (addressing TB. Harms test as trend rule);
Dolch v. United Cal. Bank, 702 F.2d 178, 180 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting adoption by
Ninth Circuit of T.B. Harms as majority rule).
159. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 986 (discussing court's analysis in case). The
court noted that the T.B. Harms test was "essentially a reiteration of the 'wellpleaded complaint' rule." Id. In other words, federal subject matter jurisdiction
existed only when the face of the complaint presented a federal question. See id.
For further discussion of the T.B. Harms test, see supranotes 71-73 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the "well-pleaded complaint" standard, see supra
notes 99-128 and accompanying text.
160. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 986-89 (noting court did not adopt second or
third prongs of T.B. Harms test in either part of its analysis).
161. See id. (noting court's reliance on Ninth Circuit precedent because of
issue's complexity). The court recognized the merit in applying earlier Ninth Circuit decisions to aid in its analysis. See id.
162. See id. at 987; see also Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993-95 (9th Cir.
1983) (discussing rationale of Topolos court's holding). The Scholastic court concluded, "it was obvious" that Topolos' "claim required a determination as to
whether the two works ...were sufficiently similar to warrant a finding of infringement - a clear question of copyright law." Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 987.
163. For further discussion of Topolos, see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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the Scholastic court concluded that Fox had not alleged such an in164
fringement claim.
The Scholastic court also looked to Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen 1 6 5 for guidance. 1 66 There, the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis
on the issue of ownership, ultimately concluding that copyright
ownership always constitutes a threshold question in determining
whether federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. 167 In agreement
with the circuit court's reasoning in Effects, the Scholastic court held
that existence of an ownership issue coupled with a copyright issue
does not necessarily prevent courts from exercising federal subject
matter jurisdiction.' 68
The Scholastic court solidified its analysis with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc.1 69 Both Vestron
and Scholastic involved a disagreement over the terms of a contract
concerning ownership of a copyright.' 70 In Vestron, the Ninth Circuit held that the ownership issue constituted a threshold factor in
determining whether a claim "arose under" the Act. 1 71 Distinguishing Vestron on its facts, the Scholastic court held the ownership issue
comprised the sole issue between Fox and Scholastic. 1 72 As a result
164. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 989 (discussing aspect of court's holding in
case).
165. 817 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1987).
166. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 987-88 (discussing aspect of court's rationale).
167. SeeEffects Assocs., Inc. 817 F.2d at 74 (reviewing Effects court's reasoning in
case). The court further reasoned that when such ownership comprised the sole
question for consideration, federal courts lacked exclusive jurisdiction. See id.
168. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 988 (discussing court's analysis of ownership
issues in copyright cases). But see Int'l Armor & Limousine Co. v. Moloney
Coachbuilders, Inc., 272 F.3d 912, 913-15 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting Seventh Circuit's
contradictory view regarding disputes concerning ownership of copyrights and
whether they "arise under" federal law). In Int'l Armor, the Seventh Circuit held
that because "the only serious dispute is how the contracts ... allocate ownership
rights in the Moloney name and business history .... the dispute arises under the
law of contracts; any trademark claims are entirely derivative of the contract issues." Id. at 916. Accordingly, the court held that the claim did not "arise under"
the Act and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 918.
The court in Scandinavian Satellite concluded the Seventh Circuit's holding
represented "a misguided interpretation of the TB. Harms test . . . and it surely
does not square with the Second Circuit's application of TB. Harms in Bassett."
291 F.3d 839, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In the ScandinavianSatellite court's view, "the
Seventh Circuit's position is premised on an unduly narrow and unrealistic reading of § 1338(a)." Id.
169. 839 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).
170. Compare Vestron, 839 F.2d at 1380-81 with Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 983-85
(noting factual differences, specifically as they relate to ownership, between both
cases).
171. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 988 (discussing court's reasoning in Vestron).
172. See id.; see also Vestron, 839 F.2d at 1381-82. The fact that the plaintiff,
Vestron, claimed ownership of the copyrights through a disputed contract gov-
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of this determination, the court concluded it could not properly
173
exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction.
B.

Rebutting Fox's Final Argument Supporting
Federal Jurisdiction

The court briefly entertained Fox's final argument that the Act
governed Scholastic's attempt to terminate the agreement, thereby
permitting federal court to hear the case. 174 Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, however, the court stressed the importance of ap17 5
plying state law to resolve those matters not addressed by the Act.
Accordingly, the Scholastic court concluded that Fox's argument
hinged upon whether Scholastic's termination concerned an issue
addressed by the Act. 176 The court found that § 203 of the Act governed the termination of a copyright license of indefinite duration.177 Because the Goosebumps contract was scheduled to expire in
2013, the court determined neither § 203 nor any other provision
of the Act governed Scholastic's right to terminate or rescind the
agreed-upon license. 178 The court therefore concluded that, because Fox's counterclaims failed to adequately seek a remedy expressly granted by the Act, it could not properly exercise federal
subject matter jurisdiction. 179 As a result, the court held California
80
state law governed this determination.1

erned by state law did not preclude federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at
1382. "[T]he beneficial owner of a copyright... is entitled to establish the facts
supporting his claim of beneficial ownership, even though that may require interpretation of a contract." Id. (citing Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 994 (9th
Cir. 1983)). "[Home Box Office, Inc.]'s intention to contest Vestron's alleged
ownership as part of its defense, regardless of any potential for success, did not
affect jurisdiction." Id.
173. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 989 (discussing court's holding in case).
174. See id. at 988 (discussing one of Fox's arguments supporting federal subject matter jurisdiction).
175. See id. (noting important distinction between claims seeking remedy
under Act and those failing to do so).
176. See id. (noting Scholastic court's holding in case). The court stressed the
necessity of addressing termination issues by the Act before it could properly invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
177. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2000).
178. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 988 (discussing court's reasoning concerning
termination of contract and whether it was addressed by Act).
179. See id. at 989 (reviewing Scholastic court's ultimate disposition in case).
180. See id. (noting court's relegation of Fox's counterclaims to state court for
adjudication).
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS: DEFINING A CLEAR AND
CONSISTENT STANDARD

The Scholastic court astutely noted the difficult yet crucial distinction between claims "arising under" the Act and those merely
seeking a determination of ownership. 1 8' More importantly, however, the court laid precedent when it established the T.B. Harms
test as the majority rule to follow when confronted with interdependent copyright and contract claims.' 82 The court further recognized the similarities between the T.B. Harms test and the "wellpleaded complaint" rule. 18 3 In doing so, it effectively stated federal
courts might exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction only when
a federal question appears on the face of a properly pleaded
84
complaint.'
While the court adopted the "well-pleaded complaint"/ T.B.
Harms standard, it also unknowingly applied the "essence of the
claim" standard with respect to the ownership issue and whether it
"arose under" the Act.1 8 5 In reaching its conclusion, however, the
court's analysis exemplifies the problems other courts experience
186
when attempting to make similar determinations.
Although the court unintentionally applied both the "wellpleaded complaint" and "essence" standard, concurrent application
of both standards in the analysis of future courts merits serious consideration. 187 Courts should apply the "well-pleaded complaint"
standard because of its requirement that a complainant seek a rem188
edy expressly granted by the Act.
181. See id. at 986 (discussing court's reasoning in case).
182. See id. The court held that the T.B. Harms test constituted the majority
rule in determining whether actions involving interdependent copyright and contract claims "arise under" the Act. See id.
183. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 986 (discussing court's rationale). The court
determined that the test delineated in T.B. Harms constituted a "reiteration" of the
"well-pleaded complaint" rule. Id.
184. See id.; see also T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964)
(discussing nature of well-pleaded complaint).
185. See Scholastic, 336 F.3d at 986-88 (noting court's incorporation of "essence" standard by looking to substance of Fox's counterclaims).
186. For further discussion of courts' varying interpretations with respect to
determining whether they may exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction over interdependent copyright and contract claims, see supra notes 75-156 and accompanying text.
187. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 191-94 (noting possible combination of
both "essence" and "well-pleaded complaint" standards by courts to advance their
reasoning and promote consistency); see also Fleischman, supra note 5, at 142-45.
188. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828. For further discussion of the first prong
of the T.B. Harms test, see supra note 71.
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Furthermore, two policy reasons support the need for applying
the "well-pleaded complaint" standard. 18 9 First, it would be inconsistent with the policies of the Act to limit a copyright holder to
state law remedies when Congress has provided federal remedies
for infringement and has given federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
to award them. 190 Additionally, applying the "well-pleaded complaint" standard helps prevent fraud. 191
Application of only the "essence" standard allows for the possibility that a copyright infringer will escape proper federal subject
matterjurisdiction through an unfounded allegation that use of the
copyrighted material fell within the terms of an oral license agreement. 192 Nevertheless, a competing concern also exists for the necessity of incorporating the "essence" standard into a court's
analysis.1 93 Because of the inherent concerns present when either
only the "essence" or "well-pleaded complaint" standards is incorporated into a court's analysis, the following proposed test demonstrates the need to apply the "essence" standard in conjunction with
1
that of the "well-pleaded complaint.

94

Under this proposed test, a court should first read the complaint. 195 If the court determines the complaint to be grounded in
copyright, then it inherently involves a case for copyright. 1 96 The
Act permits federal courts the discretion to grant injunctive re189. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 192 (discussing importance of incorporating "well-pleaded complaint" standard into analysis). For further discussion of the
"well-pleaded complaint" standard, see supra notes 99-128 and accompanying text.
190. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 192. If a court fails to incorporate the
"well-pleaded" standard into its analysis, and follows the "essence" standard exclusively, that court may effectively deny a copyright owner a proper federal forum.
See id.
191. See id. (discussing second policy concern in favor of applying "wellpleaded complaint" standard).
192. See id. (noting potential problems if court fails to apply "well-pleaded
complaint" standard).
193. See id. (discussing importance of courts' incorporation of the "essence"
standard in their reasoning). Some copyright and contract cases involve copyright
questions so insubstantial as should cause a court to deny federal subject matter
jurisdiction. See id. A skillfully drafted, "well-pleaded complaint," however, might
allow a plaintiff to gain federal subject matter jurisdiction when it would otherwise
be improper. See id.
194. See Fleischman, supranote 5, at 141-42 (discussing merit of applying both
standards in jurisdiction analysis); see also McCarthy, supra note 5, at 191-94.
195. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 142 (discussing first prong courts should
adopt when undertaking this analysis).
196. See id. Although the issue of whether the copyright claim dominates
might complicate matters, one can overcome this complication relatively quickly
and effectively. See id.
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lief. 197 Even if injunctive relief is requested, however, it does not
necessarily follow that a copyright claim has been stated.19
Assuming the plaintiff requests injunctive relief, the court
should move to the second step in its analysis. 199 This second step
incorporates various facets of the "essence" standard without the
200
subjectivity that results from the application of such a standard.
As its next step, the court should determine the cause of the
suit. ' If the complaint arises out of a copyright license, then
under this step the court must determine who suffered the harm
and who benefited by the breach of the license, and to what degree
the conflict affected each party. 20 2 In contrast to a breach of contract where a non-deserving party obtains something and the other
party fails to receive something it reasonably believes is owed, the
copyright infringer obtains something he or she does not deserve,
while the copyright holder loses the right to something that he or
she still owns. 20 3 This occurrence constitutes theft "in the abstract,
20 4
though on its face it is a violation of a contract right."
20

Finally, the court should determine whether this theft actually
occurred. 20 5 Such a theft occurs if the plaintiff, a copyright holder,
alleges a violation of a right normally secured by the federal copyright laws. 20 6 Accordingly, if the theft actually occurs, a federal
20 7
court must then hear the action.
197. See id. (discussing aspect of Act). If a plaintiff seeks damages, then no
claim upon which relief can be granted exists. See id.
198. See id. (noting federal as well as state courts may grant injunctions in
variety of suits, copyright being only one of them).
199. See id. (explaining second prong of analysis courts should adopt under
this proposed test). Typically, plaintiffs alleging infringement request injunctive
relief. See id.
200. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 142. Under this second level of analysis,
the court must look not only to what is being requested, but also at what the plaintiff requests and what the plaintiff owned before bringing the suit. See id.
201. See id.; see also McCarthy, supra note 5, at 192-93 (elaborating on second
prong of proposed test).
202. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 142.
203. See id. (noting distinction between party breaching contract and copyright infringement).
204. Id. In other words, an action involving two parties bargaining to exchange something constitutes a contract claim. See id. at 143. "If, however, it is for
one party to recover something that has been stolen, then [the claim] is for copyright infringement." Id.
205. See id. at 142 (discussing final part of court's analysis).
206. See id. (defining when theft occurs for purposes of proposed test).
207. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 142. This test "shakes" the criticism of
the "essence" standard that states judges should look to what they perceive to constitute the plaintiff's primary and controlling purpose. See id. at 144. "Once a determination has been made regarding what the plaintiff had and what the plaintiff
seeks to recover, the primary purpose becomes clear." Id.
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IMPACT: WHERE DOES THE LAW CURRENTLY LEAvE
COPYRIGHT OWNERS?

Some consider a claim involving interdependent copyright and
contract claims one of the "knottiest problems in copyright jurisprudence." 20 8 As a result, federal courts experienced difficulty in
establishing a uniform method for determining whether these types
of claims "arise under" the Act. 20 9 Almost one-half century after

T.B. Harms and the varying interpretations that case spawned, it appears courts continue to disagree over what standard they should
apply in their respective analyses. 2 1° An important reason that explains this disagreement is the fact that each standard carries both
positive and negative characteristics. 21 1 For example, adopting the
"essence" standard ensures that, once resolved, the court has before
it a copyright claim of sufficient significance to the outcome of the
dispute to justify its exercise of exclusive jurisdiction.2 1 2 On the
other hand, this standard fails to make a sharper distinction between the § 1338(a) jurisdictional issue and a merits
2 13
determination.
A proposed standard, which incorporates both the "wellpleaded complaint" and "essence" approaches, boasts stability and
coherence, effectively allowing federal courts and future litigants
some degree of predictability and stability. 2 14 Furthermore, it will
permit the courts some necessary discretion.2 15 American jurisprudence requires such discretion; however, courts must not receive
208. See NIMMER, supra note 7, at 12-14. (recognizing the difficulties inherent
in cases involving interdependent copyright and contract claims).
209. For further discussion of court struggles with cases involving interdependent copyright and contract claims, see supra notes 44-156 and accompanying text.
210. For further discussion of different interpretations courts adopt in determining whether a claim "arises under" the Act, see supra notes 75-156 and accompanying text.
211. For further discussion regarding strengths and weaknesses of each of the
three standards, see supra notes 75-156 and accompanying text.
212. For further discussion of the "essence of the claim" standard, see supra
notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
213. The "essence" standard provides a clear example of the strengths and
weaknesses contained in each approach. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 142-44.
For further discussion addressing weaknesses of the "essence of the claim" standard, see supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
214. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 142-44. For further discussion of the
proposed test, see supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
215. See id. This test is intended to combine the three views adopted from
T.B. Harms. See id. It involves combining the "essence" and "well-pleaded complaint" standards as well as providing future courts with more discretion in making
their decisions. See id. But see Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 926,
933 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting Schoenberg test permits excessive discretion by courts).
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virtually unfettered authority as the Schoenberg court attempted to
216
do with its three-prong test.
This proposed standard might permit our judicial system to
function on a more efficient, effective, and fair level, which in turn
may instill confidence in future artists seeking protection of their
works. 2 17 Therefore, if courts follow this standard in future cases,
the current state of confusion may give way to uniformity and predictability, allowing the federal judicial system to keep pace with the
2 18
rapidly evolving field of intellectual property.
ChristopherD. Birrer
216. See Fleischman, supra note 5, at 145. For further discussion of the Schoenberg test and its weaknesses, see supra notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
217. See id. (discussing potential benefits of proposed test).
218. See generally McCarthy, supranote 5, at 194-95 (discussing need for consistent approach taken by future courts faced with interdependent copyright and
contract claims).
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